Maryland\u27s Constitutional One-Subject Rule: Neither a Dead Letter nor an Undue Restriction by Figinski, M. Albert
University of Baltimore Law Review
Volume 27
Issue 2 Spring 1998 Article 3
1998
Maryland's Constitutional One-Subject Rule:
Neither a Dead Letter nor an Undue Restriction
M. Albert Figinski
George Washington University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Review by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information,
please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Figinski, M. Albert (1998) "Maryland's Constitutional One-Subject Rule: Neither a Dead Letter nor an Undue Restriction," University
of Baltimore Law Review: Vol. 27: Iss. 2, Article 3.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr/vol27/iss2/3
MARYLAND'S CONSTITUTIONAL ONE-SUBJECT RULE: 
NEITHER A DEAD LETTER NOR AN UNDUE 
RESTRICTION 
M. Albert Figinskit 
Maryland's Constitution contains constraints on the form, style, 
scope, and content of legislation,' unlike the United States Constitu-
tAB., 1959, Johns Hopkins; LL.B., 1962, University of Maryland; LL.M., 1965, 
George Washington University Law School. Member, Saul, Ewing, Weinberg & 
Green. Former Associate Judge, The Supreme Bench of Baltimore City, 1980. 
The Author was counsel of record in two of the cases discussed in this Article. 
See generally State v. Prince Georgians for Glendening, 329 Md. 68, 617 A2d 
586 (1993); Porten Sullivan Corp. v. State, 318 Md. 387, 568 A2d 1111 (1990). 
1. The MD. CONST. art. III, § 29, provides: 
The style of all Laws of this State shall be, "Be it enacted by the Gen-
eral Assembly of Maryland:" and all Laws shall be passed by original 
bill; and every Law enacted by the General Assembly shall embrace 
but one subject, and that shall be described in its title; and no Law, 
nor section of Law, shall be revived, or amended by reference to its 
title, or section only; nor shall any Law be construed by reason of its 
title, to grant powers, or confer rights which are not expressly con-
tained in the body of the Act; and it shall be the duty of the General 
Assembly, in amending any article, or section of the Code of Laws of 
this State, to enact the same, as the said article, or section would 
read when amended. And whenever the General Assembly shall enact 
any Public General Law, not amendatory of any section, or article in 
the said Code, it shall be the duty of the General Assembly to enact 
the same, in articles and sections, in the same manner, as the Code 
is arranged, and to provide for the publication of all additions and 
alterations, which may be made to the said Code. 
In addition to Section 29, other sections in Article III contain limits on legisla-
tion or legislative activities. For example, Article III, Section 27 addresses 
where and when bills may originate, imposes a three readings requirement, 
and allows for a consent calendar. "[A] majority of the whole number of" del-
egates and senators is required for "final passage." MD. CONST. art. III, § 28. 
"[U]nless ... otherwise expressly declared" in an enactment, laws "take effect 
the first day of June next after the session at which [they are] passed." MD. 
CONST. art. III, § 31. Furthermore, appropriations are strictly governed by Arti-
cle III, Sections 31 and 52, and certain "local or special [l]aws" are prohibited 
by Article III, Section 33. Moreover, specific constitutional provisions define 
the exercise of the power of eminent domain. See MD. CONST. art. III, §§ 40, 
40A, 40B, 40C. 
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tion,2 but akin to the fundamental laws of many other states. 3 Of 
the several limits Maryland's Constitution places on legislation, the 
most often litigated provision is Article III, Section 29, commonly 
known as the "one-subject rule."4 The one-subject rule provides: 
"[E]very Law enacted by the General Assembly shall embrace but 
one-subject, and that shall be described in its title . . .. "5 This two-
pronged provision, commanding that legislation (1) embrace a sin-
gle subject, and (2) have a descriptive title, was adopted in the Ma-
ryland Constitution of 1851.6 It has basically remained unchanged 
over the years.7 
Like similar provisions in other state constitutions, the one-
subject rule was intended to place a check on logrolling,8 deceptive 
2. The U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, merely requires that bills "for raising Revenue," 
originate in the House of Representatives, provides for journalizing enact-
ments, and establishes the procedure for vetoes. 
3. In 1868, Thomas Cooley, a justice of the Michigan Supreme Court and a pro-
fessor of Constitutional Law at the University of Michigan Law School, wrote 
that Maryland was one of several states to have a provision limiting enact-
ments to one subject articulated in the title of the bill. See THOMAS M. COOLEY, 
A TREATISE ON TIlE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON TIlE LEGISlA-
TIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF TIlE AMERICAN UNION 141 nA (Da Capo Press 
1972). The Court of Appeals of Maryland stated that "[a]s of 1982, 'forty-one 
state constitutions, provide[d] that an act shall not embrace more than one 
subject or object.' " Porten Sullivan Corp. v. State, 318 Md. 387, 399, 568 A.2d 
1111, 1116 (1990) (quoting lA NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTIlERLANO STATUTORY CON-
STRUCTION § 17.01 (4th ed. 1985». 
4. The one-subject rule has "been construed probably more often than any 
other part of the [Maryland] Constitution." Carl N. Everstine, Titles of Legisla-
tive Acts, 9 MD. L. REv. 197, 197 (1948). 
5. MD. CONST. art. III, § 29. 
6. See MD. CONST. of 1851 art. III, § 17. Because of the dual mandates of the one-
subject rule, it would be more accurate to call it the "single-subject/descrip-
tive-title rule." In keeping with common usage, and for purposes of brevity, 
this Article refers to the rule as the "one-subject rule." 
7. Minor textual changes occurred in the MD. CONST. of 1864 and MD. CONST. of 
1867. See Everstine, supra note 4, at 199. 
8. Logrolling is defined in Safire's Political Dictionary in the following manner: 
[M]utual aid among politicians, especially legislators who must vote 
on many items of economic importance in individual states and 
districts. 
H. L. Mencken traces the use of logrolling back to 1820. Hans 
Sperber and Travis Trittschuh have tracked down derisive newspaper 
comments of "great log rolling captains" in politics to 1809 .... 
Among settlers in the wilderness, cooperation in handling logs for 
land clearing and construction was a force overriding any differences 
among neighbors. So too in politics. "If you will vote for my inter-
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enactments, and other legislative chicanery.9 Three years after the 
Maryland Constitution of 1851 was adopted, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland explained the policy reasons for the one-subject rule in 
Davis v. State. \0 The Davis court noted that the one-subject rule was 
enacted to curtail the practice "of engrafting, upon subjects of great 
public benefit, . . . for local or selfish purposes, foreign and often 
pernicious matters."l1 The court explained that, "during the haste 
and confusion always incident" to the close of legislative sessions, 
statutes are often passed with provisions that few legislators would 
have agreed with, or "knew anything of before" the adornments 
were placed on the legislation. 12 Scholarly analysis discovered an-
est," said Congressman B. F. Butler in 1870, "I will vote for yours. 
That is how these tariffs are log-rolled through." 
Reformers have inveighed against the practice as assiduously as 
the practitioners have pursued it. In 1871 the New York Times com-
plained of Republicans who established "corrupt alliances with the 
enemy in the way of log rolling legislation." And in 1967 Time, cata-
loging the problems of the Post Office-then an institution as af-
flicted by bad politics as any in the country-noted "construction 
programs pressured on the one side by budget vagaries and on the 
other by congressional log rolling." ... 
The classic description of the theory of logrolling is attributed to Si-
mon Cameron, Pennsylvania politician who served as Lincoln's first 
Secretary of War: "You scratch my back and I'll scratch yours." 
WILLIAM SAFIRE, SAFIRE'S POUTICAL DICTIONARY 384-85 (1978). 
9. See COOLEY, supra note 3, at 143-44. 
10. 7 Md. 151 (1854). 
11. Id. at 160. 
12. Id. The Davis court explained: 
The object of this constitutional provision is obvious and highly com-
mendable. A practice had crept into our system of legislation, of en-
grafting, upon subjects of great public benefit and importance, for 
local or selfish purposes, foreign and often pernicious matters, and 
rather than endanger the main subject, or for the purpose of secur-
ing new strength for it, members were often induced to sanction and 
actually vote for such provisions, which if they were offered as inde-
pendent subjects, would never have received their support. In this 
way the people of our State, have been frequently inflicted with evil 
and injurious legislation. Besides, foreign matter has often been 
stealthily incorporated into a law, during the haste and confusion al-
ways incident upon the close of the sessions of all legislative bodies, 
and it has not unfrequently happened, that in this way the statute 
books have shown the existence of enactments, that few of the mem-
bers of the legislature knew anything of before. To remedy such and 
similar evils, was this provision inserted into the constitution, and we 
think wisely inserted. 
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other reason for the one-subject rule: to protect the integrity of the 
governor's veto power. 13 If a bill with disparate subjects is presented 
to the governor, he cannot veto the engrafted portions and sign 
into law the main subject. 14 Accordingly, if the Maryland Constitu-
tion did not contain the one-subject rule, the governor's veto power 
would be impacted adversely. 
The one-subject rule encompasses two distinct mandates. IS The 
first prong of the dual mandates,16 the single-subject prong, requires 
that statutes embrace only a single subject. 17 The second prong, the 
descriptive-title prong, demands that the title of every statute passed 
by the general assembly describes the subject matter of the statute. IS 
Each prong is distinct in its purpose and must be considered 
separately. The single-subject prong constrains logrolling and vital-
izes the governor's veto power. 19 The descriptive-title prong stifles 
[d. Similarly, in Parkinson v. State, 14 Md. 184 (1859), eight years after adop-
tion of the MD. CONST. of 1851, the court of appeals stated: 
It cannot be doubted, that this restriction upon the Legislature, 
was designed to prevent an evil, which had long prevailed in this 
State, as it had done elsewhere; which was the practice of blend-
ing, in the same law, subjects not connected with each other, and 
often entirely different. This was not unfrequently resorted to for 
the purpose of obtaining votes, in support of a measure, which 
could not have been carried without such a device. And in bills of 
a multifarious character, not inappropriately called omnibus bills, 
provisions were sometimes smuggled in and passed, in the hurry 
of business, toward the close of a session, which, if they had been 
presented singly would have been rejected. 
[d. at 193. 
13. See Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional Limits on Legislative Procedure: Legisla-
tive Compliance and Judicial Enforcement, 48 U. PITT. L. REv. 797, 809 (1987). 
14. The Governor's veto power is found in MD. CONST. art. II, § 17, which follows 
a sign-or-veto-all design. Cf Clinton v. New York, 118 S. Ct. 2091 (1998). 
Under the Line Item Veto Act, Congress granted the President the power to 
veto individual provisions contained in statutes that it passed. See id. at 2102. 
Recently, the Supreme Court held that the Act was unconstitutional because it 
violated the Presentment Clause. See id. at 2108. 
15. See Crouse v. State, 130 Md. 364, 366, 100 A. 361, 361 (1917). 
16. See Everstine, supra note 4, at 204. 
17. See Crouse, 130 Md. at 366, 100 A. at 361 (citing MD. CONST. art. III, § 29). 
18. In Crouse, the court of appeals stated that the one-subject rule "deals with two 
things: first, the subject of the enactment, and, secondly, its title. The first must 
be single, and the second must describe the subject." [d. at 366, 100 A. at 361. 
19. See Porten Sullivan Corp. v. State, 318 Md. 387, 408, 568 A.2d 1111, 1121 
(1990). 
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deceptive enactments.2D These prongs are dual mandates, and satis-
fying merely one prong will not insulate a statute from attack under 
the other.21 For example, a statute's title may be sufficiently de scrip-
tive,22 yet the described enactments could still raise a single-subject 
issue.23 
Nearly a century and a half after the adoption of the Maryland 
Constitution of 1851, the single-subject prong of the one-subject 
rule was embraced and re-energized by the Court of Appeals of Ma-
ryland in Porten Sullivan Corp. v. State.24 Three years later, the court 
of appeals reaffirmed its reliance on the one-subject rule in State v. 
Prince Georgians for Glendening.25 More recently, in Maryland Classified 
Employees Ass'n. v. State (MCEA) ,26 the court of appeals apparently 
strayed from its holdings in Porten Sullivan and Prince GeorgiansY 
This Article reviews recent case law addressing the one-subject 
rule and commends the Court of Appeals of Maryland's approach 
in Porten Sullivan. Part I outlines the legal development of the one-
subject rule.28 Part II examines the modern reliance on the rule 
growing out of the Parten Sullivan decision, also assessing the effect 
of MCEA.29 The analysis sections of this Article focus on the single-
subject prong of the one-subject rule because recent court decisions 
have not voided statutes under the descriptive-title prong.3D In Part 
III, the potential impacts of MCEA are discussed by way of an illus-
trative analysis of a recently enacted statute that has not been chal-
lenged in the courtsY Finally, Part IV details the contrasting, unbri-
dled congressional mode of legislating, where legislation replete 
20. The most renowned deceptive title case may be Painter v. Mattfeldt, 119 Md. 
466, 87 A. 413 (1913) (holding a spending act unconstitutional, and thus, void 
because a cost estimate in the title of the act grossly understated the costs that 
could arise under the act). 
21. See Maryland Classified Employees Ass'n v. State, 346 Md. 1, 12, 694 A.2d 937, 
942 (1997). 
22. "While the title must indicate the subject of the Act, it need not give an ab-
stract of its contents, nor need it mention the means and method by which 
the general purpose is to be accomplished." Mayor of Baltimore v. Reitz, 50 
Md. 574, 579 (1879). 
23. See id. at 579, 582. 
24. 318 Md. 387,568 A.2d 1111. 
25. 329 Md. 68, 617 A.2d 586 (1993). 
26. 346 Md. 1,694 A.2d 937 (1997). 
27. See id. at 15-16, 694 A.2d at 944. 
28. See infra notes 33-52 and accompanying text. 
29. See infra notes 53-168 and accompanying text. 
30. See infra notes 49-168 and accompanying text. 
31. See infra notes 169-91 and accompanying text. 
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with incongruous provisions is regularly enacted, concluding that 
the congressional process is no model for Maryland.32 
I. THE BASIC LAW 
Legal scholars traced the ongms of the one-subject rule to Ro-
man law.33 In the United States, efforts aimed at inhibiting multifari-
ous or misdescribed enactments became, and have remained, a via-
ble state constitutional restraint.34 Indeed, even Maryland's rejected 
effort to modernize the existing Maryland Constitution of 1867 (the 
"Con Con" of the mid-1960s)35 retained the one-subject rule. The 
commentary to the rejected Maryland Constitution of 1967 reem-
phasized the laudable purposes of the rule,36 concluding that its 
32. See infra notes 192-219 and accompanying text. 
33. See Millard H. Ruud, No Law Shall Embrace More Than One Subject, 42 MINN. L. 
REv. 389, 389 (1958); Edward S. Corwin, The ''Higher Law" Background of Ameri-
can Constitutional Law, 42 HARv. L. REv. 149, 160 n.36 (1928). 
34. Provisions similar to MD. CONST. art. III, § 29, first appeared in the United 
States in the ILL. CONST. of 1818. See Ruud, supra note 33, at 389. 
35. In 1967, the lOOth anniversary year of Maryland's existing constitution, dele-
gates were elected to what was popularly known as "Con Con." See REpORT OF 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION COMMISSION, IX, XI, XVI (1967) [hereinafter 
REpORT]. Meeting from September 12, 1967 to December 12, 1967, the con-
vention produced a thoroughly revised proposed constitution. See id. at 17, 71-
93. At a special election, the voters subsequently rejected the proposed consti-
tution. See Porten Sullivan Corp. v. State, 318 Md. 387, 398, 568 A.2d 1111, 
1116 (1990). The court of appeals wrote that "[ t] he 1967 Constitutional Con-
vention Commission Report sheds ... light on ... 'the reasons for requir-
ing,' " in the State constitution, that all statutes enacted contain " 'a single 
subject [with] a descriptive title.' " [d. (quoting REpORT, supra note 35, at 141). 
36. Commenting on the presentation of a "draft section in substance ... essen-
tially the same as Article III, Section 29 of the present constitution," the Com-
mission wrote: 
The purposes of the requirement that every law enacted by the 
General Assembly shall embrace but one subject which must be de-
scribed in its title have been said to be: "To prevent the Legislature 
from the enactment of laws surreptitiously; to prevent 'log-rolling' 
legislation; to give the people general notice of the character of the 
proposed legislation, so they may not be misled; to give all interested 
an opportunity to appear before committee~ of the legislature and to 
be heard upon the advisability of the proposed legislation; to advise 
members of the character of the proposed legislation, and to give 
each an opportunity to intelligently watch the course of the proposed 
bill; to guard against fraud in legislation, and against false and decep-
tive titles." 
The Commission recognizes that there have been occasions when 
sound and desirable legislation has been invalidated by the courts be-
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"absence might in some instances make it necessary for a legis-
lator to acquiesce in an undesirable bill in order to secure useful 
and necessary legislation. "37 Thus, the one-subject rule is firmly 
rooted in Maryland's constitutional history. In addition, this re-
straint on legislation has been endorsed by modem constitutional 
revisionists. 
When the one-subject rule is violated, however, the statute at is-
sue is not necessarily rendered completely void.38 Upon judicial re-
view of challenged enactments, courts have severed the main sub-
ject from the engrafted provisions.39 
Maryland's common-law severability doctrine was codified in 
1973.40 The legislative codification adopted the historic judicial prac-
tice, whereby Maryland courts have "always ... held that a law void 
in part ... may be good in part."41 Indeed, in Davis v. State,42 the 
court of appeals announced a preference for severing the irrelevant 
matter from the principal subject.43 
cause of a technical error in the title, and is also mindful of the fact 
that the drafting of titles for legislation has, because of this constitu-
tional provision, become a major chore. Nevertheless, the Commis-
sion believes that the reasons for requiring a single subject and a de-
scriptive title are still valid and that the requirement is desirable. 
REpORT, supra note 35, at 141 (quoting Painter v. Mattfeldt, 119 Md. 466, 473-
74,87 A. 413, 416 (1913». 
37. [d. 
38. See Davis v. State, 7 Md. lSI, 161 (1854). 
39. See Parten Sullivan, 318 Md. at 389,568 A.2d at 1112. 
40. Since 1973, the Maryland Code has contained a general severability provision, 
which provides: 
The provisions of all statutes enacted after July I, 1973 are severable 
unless the statute specifically provides that its provisions are not sev-
erable. The finding by a court that some provision of a statute is un-
constitutional and void does not affect the validity of the remaining 
portions of that statute, unless the court finds that the remaining 
valid provisions alone are incomplete and incapable of being c;xe-
cuted in accordance with the legislative intent. 
MD. ANN. CODE art. I, § 23 (1996). 
41. ALFRED S. NILES, MARYLAND CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 154 (1915). 
42. 7 Md. 151. 
43. [d. at 160-61. The Davis court reasoned that a law which is otherwise constitu-
tional, should not be rendered void simply because of the "introduction of a 
single foreign or irrelevant subject into it. In such a case the irrelevant matter 
would be rejected as void, while the principal subject of the law would be sup-
ported, if properly described in the title." [d. When a law contains "a number 
of discordant and dissimilar subjects, so that no one could be clearly recog-
nized as the controlling or principal one," however, the courts are obligated 
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Nevertheless, the court of appeals has avoided the need to ap-
ply the severability doctrine by expressing reluctance to defeat the 
will of the legislature.44 Accordingly, Maryland courts liberally con-
strue statutes and their titles when faced with a litigant challenging 
the applicable statute under the one-subject rule.45 This method of 
construing legislation challenged under the one-subject rule caused 
scholars to observe that "only a very small proportion of the laws so 
attacked have been held invalid."46 Deference to legislative will, de-
spite mandatory constitutional provisions, has received bitter dis-
senting rebukeY This deference to the legislature might even ex-
plain the dearth of recent precedent supporting challenges asserted 
under the descriptive-title prong of the one-subject rule. 
Under the descriptive-title prong of the one-subject rule, enact-
ments have been voided because the title of the statute did not ade-
quately describe its subject or misdescribed it.48 
to intervene and void the entire statute. [d. 
44. See State v. Norris, 70 Md. 91, 96, 16 A. 445, 446 (1889). 
45. See Hardesty v. Taft, 23 Md. 512, 525 (1865). 
46. NILES, supra note 41, at 154; see Everstine, supra note 4, at 197-98, 245. 
47. See County Comm'rs v. Meekins, 50 Md. 28, 4648 (1878) (Bowie & Alvey, lJ., 
dissenting). This resounding disapproval came in a test of the single-subject 
prong of the dual mandates of the one-subject rule. See id. at 4143. 
48. Every case challenging an enactment on the grounds that its title is not de-
scriptive of its subject matter is, like all one-subject rule litigation, sui generis. 
Each case relates to a particular title and body of an enactment. On occasion, 
the court of appeals has ruled that a title misdescribes the legislation at issue 
and voids the bill. See, e.g., Shipley v. State, 201 Md. 96, 104, 93 A.2d 67, 69-72 
(1952); Bell v. Board of County Comm'rs, 195 Md. 21, 27-34, 72 A.2d 146, 149-
50 (1950); Quenstedt v. Wilson, 173 Md. 11, 22, 194 A. 354, 359 (1937); Culp 
v. Comm'rs of Chestertown, 154 Md. 620, 627-32, 141 A. 410, 413-15 (1928); 
Weber v. Probey, 125 Md. 544, 552-53, 94 A. 162, 165 (1915). The leading case 
is Painter v. Mattfeldt, 119 Md. 466, 87 A. 413 (1913). In Painter, the issue was 
the title of 1912 Md. Laws ch. 345, which related to roads in Baltimore 
County. See id. at 468, 87 A. at 414. The title of the enactment provided for 
$1.5 million in bonds to pay for improved roads; but that title, the court of 
appeals found, "diverted public attention from a great and indefinite liability, 
in excess of one million five hundred thousand dollars, imposed upon the 
taxpayers of the county. It is a glaringly false, deceptive and misleading title." 
Id. at 479, 87 A. at 418. Because the provision creating liability in excess of the 
bond amount was "an essential portion of the very substance of the whole 
scheme of the Act," id. at 479-80, 87 A. at 418, the court struck down the en-
tire Act. See id. at 480, 87 A. at 418. 
On the other hand, in some cases, the court has used more narrow titles 
to circumscribe the reach of enactments, thus, preserving their constitutional-
ity. See, e.g., Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n v. Elgin, 53 Md. App. 452, 
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However, an effective assault has not been mounted under the de-
scriptive-title prong for three decades.49 A multitude of courts faced 
with challenges asserted under the descriptive-title prong have up-
held the sufficiency of a title's description.50 
As professional staff has been added to assist the legislature, ti-
tle drafting to encompass all elements of a bill has been achieved. 51 
460, 454 A.2d 408, 413 (1983) (citing Barrett v. Clark, 189 Md. 116, 127, 54 
A.2d 128, 133 (1947»; if. Board of County Comm'rs v. Colgan, 274 Md. 193, 
200 .. {)1, 334 A.2d 89, 93-94 (1975). 
49. In Clark's Brooklyn Park, Inc .. v. Hranicka, 246 Md. 178,227 A.2d 726 (1967), the 
court of appeals was confronted with an enactment having a title describing 
the bill as "providing a criminal statute for ... 'shoplifting,'" which con-
tained a section "providing for the merchants' immunity from civil liability 
when" they detained suspected shoplifters "on reasonable grounds." Id. at 
183, 227 A.2d at 728. One of the issues on appeal of the lower court's judg-
ment for slander and false imprisonment was whether the merchant's immu-
nity provision was "unconstitutional because the title of the Act [was] defec-
tive and misleading in contravention of Art. III, § 29 .. " Id. at 182, 227 A.2d at 
728. The court held that the merchant's immunity provision was void, but the 
criminal provisions were severed and upheld .. See id. at 185, 227 A .. 2d at 730. 
Although the case appears to have been argued and resolved on the issue of 
whether the title was deceptive, thereby violating the descriptive-title prong of 
the one-subject rule, there is language in the opinion which may support a 
conclusion that, in fact, the court of appeals found a single-subject prong vio-
lation. In other words, the enactment created criminal penalties for shoplift-
ing and, distinctly, certain civil immunity for a merchant who detained an al-
leged shoplifter. See id. 
50. See, e.g., Ogrinz v. James, 309 Md. 381, 398, 524 A.2d 77, 86 (1987); Whiting-
Turner Contracting Co. v. Coupard, 304 Md .. 340, 361, 499 A.2d 178, 189 
(1985) (citing Painter, 119 Md. at 473,87 A. at 416); Equitable Life Assurance 
Soc'y v. Maryland Comm'n Human Relations, 290 Md. 333, 339-43, 430 A.2d 
60, 64-65 (1981); Baltimore Transit Co .. v. Metropolitan Transit Auth .. , 232 Md. 
509, 520-22, 194 A.2d 643, 649-50 (1963); Roland Elec. Co. v. Mayor of Balti-
more, 210 Md. 396, 403-04, 124 A.2d 783, 787-88 (1956); Heath v. State, 198 
Md .. 455, 462-63, 85 A.2d 43, 46-47 (1951); Goldsmith v. Mead Johnson & Co., 
176 Md. 682, 688-89, 7 A.2d 176-79 (1939); Mylander v. Connor, 172 Md. 329, 
334, 191 A. 430, 432 (1937); Browne v .. Mayor of Baltimore, 163 Md. 212, 219, 
161 A.2d 24, 27 (1932); Redmond v. State, 155 Md .. 13, 17, 141 A. 383, 384 
(1928); Dahler v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 133 Md. 644, 649-
50, 106 A. 10 (1919); Mayor of Baltimore v. Wollman, 123 Md .. 310, 314, 91 
A .. 2d 339,341 (1914). 
51. Guidance for staff involved in drafting bills is set forth in MARYlAND STYLE 
MANUAL FOR STATUTORY LAw (1985), and LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING MANUAL 
(1989). Each was produced. by the General Assembly'S Department of Legisla-
tive Reference. The Maryland Style Manual carefully addressed the titling re-
quirement for bills. The one-subject rule was set out in pertinent part, and, in 
1987, two years before the 1989 Session which was the backdrop for Porten Sul-
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Moreover, there has been a trend toward enactment of comprehen-
sive legislation, enactments dealing with a single broad subject, and 
the court of appeals has not conceived the one-subject rule to 
thwart such broad legislative initiatives.52 Staff, however, does not 
log roll or try to win votes by misjoinder of subjects. That remains, 
as recent cases show, a legislative foible. 
II. THE RECENT CASES 
SinGe 1989, the Court of Appeals of Maryland has decided 
three cases in which legislation w;as challenged on the ground of 
the one-subject rule.53 Each case arose out of bills that were passed 
after legislative maneuvering during the closing days of a legislative 
session.54 Many of the provisions at issue before the legislature were 
controversial, and thus, initially either becalmed because of insuffi-
livan carp. v. State, 318 Md. 387, 568 A.2d 1111 (1990), the style guide noted, 
"Maryland has one of the strictest title requirements of the 50 states .... " 
MARYLAND STYLE MANUAL 21. The manual went on to set forth the basic rudi-
ments for the proper drafting of bill titles: 
With a few exceptions, all titles have 3 general parts: the short ti-
tle, the purpose paragraph, and the function paragraph(s) .... The 
purpose of the short title is to give a general impression of the con-
tent of the bill. As a rule, no more than six to eight words need be 
used. . . . The purpose paragraph is the part of the title that de-
scribes in constitutionally acceptable detail what the bill does. This is 
the part of the title to which the constitutional test is actually ap-
plied. The purpose paragraph should contain a summary by catego-
ries of the changes proposed to be made in the bill. 
Id. at 21-22. 
52. In upholding sweeping legislation creating and empowering the State's 
Human Relations Commission to guard, by the title of the enabling statute, 
against "discrimination" and against an attack from the insurance industry, 
the court of appeals opined: 
The cases reflect that the object of the "one subject" requirement 
is not to thwart the legislature when it seeks to pass comprehensive 
legislation, see, e.g., Madison Nat'l Bank v. Newrath, 261 Md. 321, 338, 
275 A.2d 495 (1971) (involving adoption of the Uniform Commercial 
Code);. Panitz v. Comptroller, 247 Md. 501, 511, 232 A.2d 891 (1967) 
(with respect to a Supplemental Appropriations Bill), but merely to 
thwart the stealthy incorporation of foreign matter into a bill receiv-
ing popular support. Baltimore v. Reitz, [50 Md. 574, 579 (1879)]. 
Equitable Life, 290 Md. at 34344, 430 A.2d at 66. 
53. See Maryland Classified Employees Ass'n v. State, 346 Md. 1, 694 A.2d 937 
(1997); State v. Prince Georgiahs for Glendening, 329 Md. 68, 617 A.2d 586 
(1993); Porten SuUivan, 318 Md. 387, 568 A.2d 1111. 
54. See MCEA, 346 Md. at 12, 694 A.2d at 942; Prince Georgians, 329 Md. at 71, 617 
A.2d at 587; Porten Sullivan, 318 Md. at 395,568 A.2d at 1114-15. 
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cient support or were simply rejected.55 Despite OpposItIOn, how-
ever, the legislature ultimately enacted statutes that incorporated 
many of these provisions. 56 Accordingly, each case was resolved after 
careful judicial review of the legislative amalgamation of controver-
sial matters into a single statute. 
From this trilogy of cases, the traditional grounds for the one-
subject rule have been restated and reshapedY Each case requires 
careful review in order to discern the court's adherence to certain 
long-standing principles. Thorough scrutiny of each court's analysis 
demonstrates how Maryland courts have articulated guidelines for 
applying the one-subject rule. Additionally, each case is analyzed in 
an effort to discern the court's method of applying the guidelines 
to the particular legislative circumstances at issue. 
A. .Porten Sullivan Corp. v. State 
\ 
.,Porten Sullivan Corp. v. State'8 was the first case in the trilogy 
and presents the most comprehensive analysis of the one-subject 
rule. Appellants in Porten Sullivan faced a heavy burden because, 
historically, the one-subject rule was rarely applied by courts to 
strike down a statute.59 Nonetheless, in Porten Sullivan, judicial reluc-
tance was overcome by what the court of appeals decided was "a 
textbook example of legislation designed to frustrate" the very pur-
pose of the one-subject rule.60 Initially, the House passed a bill that 
contained "two uncomplicated and brief tax measures."61 Prince 
55. See MCEA, 346 Md. at 5-12, 694 A,2d at 93842; Prince Georgians, 329 Md. at 71, 
617 A,2d at 587; Porten Sullivan, 318 Md. at 389-95, 568 A.2d at 1112-14. 
56. See MCEA, 346 Md. at 12, 694 A,2d at 942; Prince Georgians, 329 Md. at 71,617 
A,2d at 587; Parten Sullivan, 318 Md. at 395,568 A,2d at 1114-15. 
57. See MCEA, 346 Md. at 12-14, 694 A,2d at 94243; Prince Georgians, 329 Md. at 72-
73,617 A,2d at 587-88; Porten Sullivan, 318 Md. at 397409,568 A,2d at 1115-22. 
58. 318 Md. 387, 568 A,2d 1111 (1990). 
59. See id. at 402,568 A,2d at 1118 ("[O]nly twice have we struck down a statute 
for a 'single subject' violation."). Even this modest claim was later questioned 
and disparaged. See MCEA, 346 Md. at 14 n.3, 694 A,2d at 943 n.3. 
60. Parten Sullivan, 318 Md. at 408, 568 A,2d at 1121. 
61. Id. at 389, 568 A,2d at 1112. Parten Sullivan involved a challenge to an emer-
gency measure enacted in the waning days of the 1989 Session of the Mary-
land General Assembly. See id. at 395, 568 A.2d at 1114-15. The Maryland Con-
stitution authorizes the General Assembly to declare (in all but a limited 
category of measures, e.g. a law making an appropriation) an enactment "an 
emergency law" which requires a vote of "three-fIfths of all of the members 
elected to each of the two Houses of the General Assembly." MD. CONST. art. 
XVI, § 2. Although the Maryland Constitution seems to say that an "emer-
gency law" should be one "necessary for the immediate preservation of the 
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George's County's government and its House delegation pushed the 
two tax measures through the House of Delegates.62 While these 
House bills were pending in the Senate, events outside the legisla-
ture impacted the legislative process.63 Specifically, the press re-
ported allegations that political donations from developers and 
their allies were improperly influencing members of Prince 
George's County's Council in their consideration of zoning 
applications.64 
Anti-growth partisans proposed sweeping legislation to their 
county's senators.65 The proposals had two main goals: (1) public 
disclosure of contributions to council members,66 and (2) mandated 
disqualification of any member from participating in zoning matters 
of the contributors.67 The anti-growth partisans equated the disclo-
sure and disqualification proposals to ethics provisions.68 These ethics 
public health and safety," id., the judiciary has deferred to the legislature, 
holding that the General Assembly alone has the power to determine when an 
emergency exists. See Gebhart v. Hill, 189 Md. 135, 139, 54 A.2d 315, 317 
(1947). When a bill is enacted as an emergency measure, it becomes effective 
on the date specified in the enactment, regardless of the provision that no law 
shall take effect before June 1 in the year of enactment. MD. CONST. art. XVI, 
§ 2. Routinely, an emergency law provides that it shall be effective on the date 
the bill is signed by the governor. See, e.g., 1996 Md. Laws, ch. 2. 
62. Parten Sullivan, 318 Md. at 393-94, 568 A.2d at 1114. As the court of appeals 
wrote: 
[The] legislative beginnings [of the enactment, Ch. 244, 1989 
Laws of Md.] were modest: HB 889, designed to extend the life of a 
Prince George's County energy tax, and HB 890, intended to do the 
same for a special transfer tax in Prince George's County. In the Sen-
ate, however, the two uncomplicated and brief tax measures found 
themselves embodied in a greatly-amended version of HB 890 that 
also enacted extensive ethical regulations pertaining to the Prince 
George's County Council. It was only after this metamorphosis that 
HB 890 became Chapter 244. 
[d. at 389, 568 A.2d at 1112. 
63. See id. at 394, 568 A.2d at 1114. 
64. See id. 
65. See id. 
66. See id. 
67. See id. Because the tumult over contributions by developers and allies to 
county councilman occurred late in the session, those seeking to redress the 
issue were constrained by the provision that "during the last thirty-five calen-
dar days of a ... session," a bill can only be introduced with approval of "two-
thirds" vote. MD. CONST. art. III, § 27. 
68. See Parten Sullivan, 318 Md. at 395,568 A.2d at 1114. The Parten Sullivan court 
described the Senate's amendments as "extensive ethical regulations." [d. at 
389, 568 A.2d at 1112. 
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proVisIons were subsequently engrafted, by the Senate, onto House 
Bill 890.69 The court of appeals noted: 
What had been essentially a one-page bill concerning 
"Prince George's County-Transfer Tax" was now transmog-
rified into lengthy emergency legislation extending to 
"Prince George's County Council-Ethics and Taxing Au-
thority." In that form, HB 890 passed the Senate on 6 April 
1989, after suspension of the rules. 
On 8 April, with but 'two days remaining in the 1989 
session, a divided Prince George's County House delegation 
endorsed the bill. It passed the House on 10 April, the last 
day of the 1989 session, and thus became Chapter 244.70 
The ethics provisions were challenged on federal and state con-
stitutional grounds.71 One challenge was related to the amalgama-
tion of ethics provisions and taxing provisions.72 That challenge was 
predicated on the one-subject rule.73 In resolving the case, the court 
of appeals addressed only the challenge asserted under the one-
subject rule.74 
The Appellant's challenge was "straightforward,"75 arguing: 
The "tax" measures have been treated as subjects of sepa-
rate legislation in the past. The "tax" provisions now con-
tained in Chapter 244 have nothing to do with development 
control or ethics. They are revenue measures the proceeds 
of which have been used to fund education, drug programs, 
and other needs of Prince George's County. The special 
69. See id. at 395, 568 A.2d at 1114. 
70. [d. at 395, 568 A.2d at 1114-15. 
71. See id. at 395, 568 A.2d at 1115. The court of appeals explained: 
[d. 
The complaint alleged that Chapter 244 violated the [F]irst 
[A]mendment to the United States Constitution and Article 40 of the 
Maryland Declaration of Rights in numerous ways; the equal protec-
tion guarantees of the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment and Article 24 of 
the Maryland Declaration of Rights; Article III, § 29 of the Maryland 
Constitution; the Home Rule Amendment of Article XI-A of the Ma-
ryland Constitution; and the separation of powers required by Article 
8 of the Declaration of Rights. 
72. See id. Specifically, the complaint alleged that Chapter 244 violated Article III, 
Section 29 of the Maryland Constitution. See id. 
73. See id. 
74. See id. at 396, 568 A.2d at 1115. 
75. [d. 
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"ethics" portions of Chapter 244 have nothing to do with 
taxation or revenue raising. "It is simple sophistry to join, 
as one subject, ethics and taxing authority. "76 
To the contrary, the State argued "that the single subject here is the 
management of public affairs in Prince George's County."77 
The court of appeals reviewed the history of the one-subject 
rule,78 the cases construing it,79 and the construction given to simi-
lar provisions by other states.80 The court noted its traditional defer-
ence to legislative action, its liberal construction of the one-subject 
rule, and the court's rare invocation of the one-subject rule to strike 
down an enactment.81 Nevertheless, the court stated: "[T]he 'single-
subject' provision is still a part of our Constitution. As such, it is not 
to be treated as a dead letter, and we believe we must apply it to 
the statute now before us. "82 
The court of appeals found the ethics provisions of "Chapter 
244 distinct from those" provisions relating to taxes. 83 Furthermore, 
the court ruled that the statute "d[id] not provide broadly for the 
structure and organization of Prince George's County govern-
ment,"84 and was not comprehensive legislation.85 
The Parten Sullivan court recognized that certain general state-
ments from the legislature guided its effort to apply the one-subject 
rule. 86 In particular, the court of appeals noted the importance of 
76. Id. (quoting Brief for Appellant at 46, Porten Sullivan Corp. v. State, 318 Md. 
387, 568 A.2d 1111 (1990) (No. 93». 
77. Id. at 396, 568 A.2d at 1115. 
78. See id. at 397-98, 568 A.2d at 1115-16. 
79. See id. at 399-403, 568 A.2d at 1116-19. 
80. See id. at 398-403, 568 A.2d at 1116-18. 
81. See id. at 402, 568 A.2d at 1118. 
82. Id. at 403, 568 A.2d at 1118. 
83. Id. at 404, 568 A.2d at 1119. 
84. Id. at 405, 568 A.2d at 1119-20. In passing, the court of appeals noted that the 
title to Chapter 244 did not "suggest that the general structure and organiza-
tion of Prince George's County are" the subject of the enactment. Id. at 405, 
568 A.2d at 1120; if. Clark's Brooklyn Park, Inc. v. Hranicka, 246 Md. 178, 184-
86, 227 A.2d 726, 729-30 (1967) (discussing the law as it applies to the titling 
of a bill). 
85. See Porten Sullivan, 318 Md. at 405-D6, 568 A.2d at 1120 (citing Madison Nat'l 
Bank v. Newrath, 261 Md. 321, 275 A.2d 495 (1971». The Newrath court up-
held the Vniform Commercial Code against a one-subject rule attack because, 
despite the extensive nature of the V.C.C., it dealt with only" 'one general 
subject--commercial transactions-[albeit with] many related aspects.''' Id. at 
406, 568 A.2d at 1120 (quoting Newrath, 261 Md. at 338, 275 A.2d at 504). 
86. See id. at 402, 568 A.2d at 1118 (quoting Whiting-Turner Contract Co. v. 
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the following language: "distinct and incongruous"87 subjects may 
not be joined, while "connection and interdependence"88 are akin 
to "germaneness"89 and support constitutionality.9o However, the 
court understood "the difficulty of defining with precision when a 
measure contains 'distinct and incongruous subjects.' "91 
In an effort to provide some guidance, the court suggested that 
"a measure that begins life as a comprehensive one, and then has 
additional details inserted may survive a [one-subject rule] attack 
more readily than an originally narrow bill which becomes a very 
broad one. "92 Despite this attempt to offer guidance, according to 
the court of appeals, the "question ordinarily must be answered on 
a case-by-case basis," giving due regard to the reasons given for the 
single-subject rule: 
1. To avoid the necessity for a legislator to acquiesce in a 
bill he or she opposes in order to secure useful and neces-
sary legislation; to prevent the engrafting of foreign matter 
on a bill, which foreign matter might not be supported if 
offered independently. 
2. To protect, on similar ground, a governor's veto power.93 
Viewing the 1989 statute as "a textbook example of legislation 
designed to frustrate these purposes,"94 the Porten Sullivan court 
held that Chapter 244 failed the single-subject prong of the one-
subject rule.95 Even though the statute violated the single-subject 
prong of the one-subject rule by "contain[ing] two distinct and in-
congruous subjects,"96 the court severed the ethics provision, and 
Coupard, 304 Md. 340,499 A.2d 178 (1985». 
87. [d. at 406, 568 A.2d at 1120. 
88. [d. at 407, 568 A.2d at 1121. 
89. [d. (citing BLACK'S LAw DICIlONARY 618 (5th ed. 1979». 
90. See id. at 407, 568 A.2d at 1121. 
91. [d. at 406, 568 A.2d at 1120. 
92. [d. at 407, 568 A.2d at 1120. 
93. [d. at 408, 568 A.2d at 1121 (citing Parkinson v. State, 14 Md. 184, 193 (1859); 
Davis v. State, 7 Md. 151, 160 (1854); REpORT, supra note 35, at 141). 
94. [d. at 408, 568 A.2d at 1121. Although the legislative amalgamation at issue in 
Pmen Sullivan occurred in the waning days of the 1989 session of the General 
Assembly, the court of appeals did not emphasize that fact, despite the vener-
able concern about the hurry of business (and resulting opportunity for legis-
lative mischief) in the rush to close the session. See supra note 12. 
95. See Pmen Sullivan, 318 Md. at 409, 568 A.2d at 1121-22. 
96. [d. at 409, 568 A.2d at 1121. 
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thus, preserved the tax provision.97 
B. State v. Prince Georgians for Glendening 
Despite Porten Sullivan, in 1992 the legislature repeated its 
amalgamation efforts by engrafting a revised" 'ethics' bill applicable 
to local elected officials in Prince George's County" onto a bill 
aimed at governing planning and zoning matters in Montgomery 
County.98 In State v. Prince Georgians for Glendening,99 the court of ap-
peals held that this statute violated the one-subject rule. loo The 
court applied Porten Sullivan without breaking any new doctrinal 
ground. 
The Prince Georgian's court determined that the Montgomery 
County planning and zoning provisions and the Prince George's 
County ethics standards were simply " 'distinct and incongruous' 
and 'distinct and separate.' "101 The court used the case-by-case ap-
proach and dwelled on the legislative trail that the erroneously 
joined matters followed in the General Assembly.102 In short, Prince 
Georgians recognized, for doctrinal purposes, the seminal quality of 
Porten Sullivan.103 Together, these two decisions illustrate that dis-
tinct and separate, non-germane matters do not pass muster under 
the single-subject prong of the one-subject rule. 
After Porten Sullivan and Prince Georgians, the single-subject 
prong of the one-subject rule was hardly a dead letter. This constitu-
tional mandate, together with the descriptive-title prong, restrained 
the logrolling and "Christmas tree"l04 legislation that were increas-
ingly becoming the congressional modes of enacting federal legisla-
tion over the past two decades.105 Maryland, unlike Congress, pro-
hibits the blending of unconnected subjects in legislation and the 
97. See id. at 409-11, 568 A.2d at 1122. 
98. State v. Prince Georgians for Glendening, 329 Md. 68, 71, 617 A.2d at 586, 587 
(1993). 
99. Id. 
100. See id. at 75-76, 617 A.2d at 589 (holding that the zoning provisions and ethics 
and elections standards in Chapter 643 of the Acts of 1992 were indeed "dis-
tinct and incongruous" and therefore violated the one-subject rule). 
101. Id. . 
102. See id. at 74-75, 617 A.2d at 588-89. The court noted that bills to enact ethics 
provisions applicable to Prince George's County Council members had been 
introduced, but not enacted, in both the 1990 and 1991 sessions of the Gen-
eral Assembly. See id. at 71, 617 A.2d at 587. 
103. See id. at 72, 617 A.2d at 587-88. 
104. See infra note 193 and accompanying text. 
105. See infra notes 192-219 and accompanying text. 
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smuggling of incongruous subjects into omnibus bills. 106 It does so 
in large measure because of the firm, though somewhat vague, com-
mand of the one-subject rule. The final case in the trilogy, Maryland 
Classified Employees Ass'n v. State,I07 provided the court of appeals an 
opportunity to alter what Porten Sullivan and Prince Georgians had 
revitalized. 
C. Maryland Classified Employees Ass'n v. State 
In Maryland Classified Employees Ass'n v. State,108 a pilot program 
intended to privatize certain child support enforcement services was 
appended to a welfare reform measure, and challenged on the basis 
of the one-subject rule. \09 A union and seven of its members sought 
a declaratory judgment that certain provisions of Chapter 491 of the 
1995 Maryland Laws were unconstitutional. 110 
The challenged provisions created a four-year pilot program for 
privatizing child support enforcement services in Baltimore City and 
Queen Anne's County. III Previously, these county's child support en-
forcement services were provided by state unionized employees 
working for the Department of Human Resources.ll2 Appellants 
contended that the merger of provisions aimed at privatizing child 
support with welfare reform provisions involved true legislative ma-
nipulation. ll3 Nevertheless, the blended statute withstood constitu-
tional challenge. 114 
The background for the legislative commingling of separate 
bills was a political debate that continued over several sessions of 
the General Assembly.ll5 In 1994, Governor Schaefer supported leg-
islation "authorizing a comprehensive pilot program of AFDC re-
form in three subdivisions of the State, but then vetoed the bill be-
106. Cf Parkinson v. State, 14 Md. 184, 193 (1859) ("And in bills of a multifarious 
character, not inappropriately called omnibus bills, provisions were sometimes 
smuggled in and passed, in the hurry of business, toward the close of a ses-
sion, which, if they had been presented singly would have been rejected."). 
107. 346 Md. 1,694 A.2d 937 (1997). 
108. [d. 
109. See id. at 3, 694 A.2d at 938. 
110. See id. 
111. See id. 
112. See id. 
113. See id. at 4-5, 694 A.2d at 938 ("Particularly egregious, in [Appellants] view, 
was the manner in which the consolidation was accomplished."). See id. at 5-
12, 694 A.2d at 93842, for details of the legislative history. 
114. See id. at 20-21, 694 A.2d at 946. 
115. See id. at 34, 694 A.2d at 938. 
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cause of certain amendments added by the Legislature."1l6 Mter 
Governor Schaefer left office, nineteen bills were introduced in the 
1995 session dealing with public assistance programs, including four 
similar to the 1994 bill that Governor Schaefer had vetoed. 117 Fur-
ther, thirty-one bills proposed in 1995 dealt "with child or spousal 
support." 118 The constitutional challenge at issue in MCEA arose 
from events that occurred during the waning moments of the 1995 
session, when House Bill 1177, after its defeat in the Senate, was en-
grafted onto Senate Bill 754. 119 
Senate Bill 754 was introduced to establish a pilot program for 
welfare reform. 120 The pilot program was primarily designed to cre-
ate supervised job search activities and to allow counties to termi-
nate AFDC payments if either the work requirement was not met or 
excused. 121 On the Senate floor, Senate Bill 754 was amended to al-
low for the suspension of one's driver's license where a driver fails 
to make child support payments. 122 Senate Bill 754 made its way 
through the Senate while House Bill 1177 moved through the 
House. 123 
House Bill 1177, as introduced, called for a privatization pilot 
program for child support enforcement. 124 The House passed the 
116. Id. Governor Schaefer's veto message may be found at 1994 Md. Laws 3865. 
See id. 
117. See id. 
118. [d. 
119. See id. at 12, 694 A.2d at 942. The House approved the engraftment of House 
Bill 1177 onto Senate Bill 754 "[O]n the evening of ... the final day for legis-
lative action .... " Id. Thereafter, Senate Bill 754, as amended, "was returned 
to the Senate for concurrence." Id. The Senate concurred at 10:50 p.m., sev-
enty minutes before the General Assembly adjourned sine die. See id. 
120. See id. at 5, 694 A.2d at 938-39 (noting that Senate Bill 754 was initially in-
tended to establish pilot programs in three subdivisions: Baltimore City, Anne 
Arundel County, and Prince George's County). 
121. See id. at 6, 694 A.2d at 939. 
122. See id. at 7, 694 A.2d at 940. The driver's license suspension provision was not 
directly at issue in MCEA. Still, one wonders what rationalization could be 
proffered to support suspending a driver's license to enforce something as un-
related as welfare reform and child support. While suspending a driver's li-
censes might be germane to enforcement in general, it surely would not be im-
mune from constitutional doubt given the reasons behind the one-subject 
rule. Cf supra text accompanying notes 8-14 .. 
123. See MCEA, 346 Md. at 7, 694 A.2d at 940. 
124. See id. Initially, House Bill 1177 was intended to create programs in Baltimore 
City and in two unspecified counties to be selected by the Department of 
Human Resources. See id. The Department was to adopt regulations requiring 
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bill after it was amended to include a driver's license suspension 
sanction. 125 The Senate, however, ultimatelyI26 defeated House Bill 
1177.127 
On the same day that House Bill 1177 failed in the Senate, Sen-
ate Bill 754 began to move in the House. 128 A number of amend-
ments were adopted, including "the [same] child support enforce-
ment 'privatization' provisions that had been included in House Bill 
1177."129 Mter these amendments were adopted, the House passed 
Senate Bill 754, and returned the bill to the Senate for concur-
rence. I3O At 10:50 p.m. on the last night of the 1995 session, the 
Senate concurred in the House amendments.13I Thereafter, the bill 
was signed into law by Governor Glendening. 132 
The resurrection of the provision privatizing child support en-
forcement from the defeated rubble of House Bill 1177, via enact-
ment of Senate Bill 754, was particularly galling to the bill's oppo-
nents, primarily the state's unionized employees. 133 Their challenge 
the transfer of all aspects of child support enforcement to one or more pri-
vate contractors. See id. Before it passed the House, House Bill 1177 was 
amended to limit the program to Baltimore City and one county. See id. at 9, 
694 A.2d at 941. As a paean to unionized state employees, House Bill 1177 re-
quired private contractors to offer employment to displaced state employees. 
See id. 
125. See id. 
126. Duririg Senate consideration, House Bill 1177 was amended to limit the pro-
gram to Baltimore City and Queen Anne's County, and allowed any state em-
ployee to return to state service with protected benefits and seniority rights. 
See id. at 11, 694 A.2d at 942. 
127. See id. Two days before the end of the legislative session, the Senate defeated 
House Bill 1177 by a 24-23 vote. See id. 
128. See id. 
129. Id. at 12, 694 A.2d at 942. 
130. See id. 
131. See id. 
132. See id. The bill became Chapter 491 of the 1995 Laws of Maryland. See id. In 
accordance with the new statute's command, "the Board of Public Works ap-
proved a contract transferring the child support enforcement functions in the 
two subdivisions to Lockheed Martin IMS." Id. at 12 n.2, 694 A.2d at 942 n.2. 
133. A news report on MCEA appeared in The Daily Record. See Bradey A. Kukuk, 
Union Bid to Overturn Privatization of Support Enforcement Rejected, DAILY REc., 
June 10, 1997, at 17A-18A. That report, in part, read: 
In 1995, the Senate failed by one vote to pass HB 1177, a bill that 
would allow a private company to perform child support collection 
services in Baltimore City and Queen Anne's County. 
State workers lobbied hard against the bill ... and defeated it by 
a single vote. But, in the closing moments of the session, legislators 
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to the enactment of Senate Bill 754, however, was rejected by the 
court of appeals. 134 Mter reviewing Porten Sullivan, and considering 
evidence135 of "[ t] he nexus between child support enforcement and 
weaning people off of AFDC,"136 the MCEA court concluded that 
the one-subject rule was not violated. 137 The court reasoned that 
there was "not just a close connection, but a true interdependence, 
between effective child support enforcement and the goal of signifi-
candy reducing the number of people relying on AFDC."138 There-
fore, a "pilot program of 'privatizing' child support enforcement in 
Baltimore City and Queen Anne's County" was said to be a legitimate 
part of the statute's goal.139 
Beyond its basic holding, MCEA is important for the following 
reasons: (1) its search for evidence of congruity or germaneness be-
yond the Maryland legislative history,140 (2) the irrelevance of the 
defeat of House Bill 1177,141 and (3) its handling of the precedent 
set by Porten Sullivan. 142 
1. Evidence Used 
A notable feature of MCEA was the court's use of congressional 
and other federal declarations to find "[ t] he nexus between child 
added virtually the entire text of HB 1177 onto the Welfare Reform 
Act, SB 754. 
[MCEA's attorney] said senators faced a catch-22. If the 24 sena-
tors who voted against the privatization bill tried to remain consistent 
and vote against it again, they would be on record as opposing wel-
fare reform. That's the situation the single subject rule was designed 
to prevent, he said. 
Id. at 18A. 
134. See MCEA, 346 Md. at 20-21, 694 A.2d at 946. 
135. See id. at 17-21, 694 A.2d at 94546. 
136. Id. at 18, 694 A.2d at 945. 
137. See id. at 20-21, 694 A.2d at 946. 
138. Id. 
139. Id. at 21, 694 A.2d at 946. In effect, the court of appeals found that a priva-
tized pilot program was just a means to administer welfare reform, and that 
privatized enforcement was not a distinct subject. See id. Regardless, two years 
after privatization, no great improvement had been accomplished. See Robert 
E. Pierre, Baltimore's Test of Privatization Comes up Short, WASH. POST, January 25, 
1998, at B1. 
140. See MCEA, 346 Md. at 18-20, 694 A.2d at 94546. 
141. Aside from stating that House Bill 1177 was defeated, the court did not dis-
cuss how, or whether, its defeat impacted the court's one-subject rule analysis. 
See id. at 11, 694 A.2d at 942. One could conclude, therefore, that its defeat 
was irrelevant to MCEA's one-subject rule analysis. 
142. See id. at 12-16, 694 A.2d at 942-44. 
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support enforcement and weaning people off AFDC."143 Various 
congressional reports and enactments, as well as testimony from 
congressional hearings were used to demonstrate the true interde-
pendence between effective child support enforcement and reduc-
tion of AFDC dependency.l44 This evidence, however, was indepen-
dently gathered by the court, and not presented in either of the 
parties' briefs filed in the case. 145 
The required nexus between the nature of welfare and enforce-
ment of child support may have been a peculiarly apt area for gui-
dance from federal actions. 146 State statutes and their respective leg-
islative histories generally do not include extra-territorial 
evidence. 147 Moreover, the use of congressional commentary to 
demonstrate the required nexus is no more unusual than where, in 
Porten Sullivan, the court of appeals reviewed a host of out-of-state 
cases-not cited by the parties-to lend credence to its formulation 
of the rationale for the one-subject rule. 148 
2. The Irrelevance of the Defeat of House Bill 1177 
The legal analysis employed by the MCEA court gave no weight 
to the defeat of House Bill 1177.149 The MCEA court, through its si-
lence, implied that the one-subject rule does not, by its terms, for-
bid the joinder of a defeated bill's provisions with another sepa-
rately enacted bill. ISO The court's silence about the defeat of House 
Bill 1177 emphasized what students of the legislature, or lobbyists, 
have always known: defeat of a bill does not bring the curtain down 
on a legislative idea, so long as bills dealing with the same subject 
remain alive. The one-subject rule forbids an illicit amalgamation of 
disparate items. 151 However, it does not forbid joinder that can be 
justified under a convenient umbrella of items which do not cause 
143. [d. at 18, 694 A.2d at 945. 
144. See id. at 18-21, 694 A.2d at 945-46. 
145. See id. 
146. Funds for welfare come from the federal coffers. State agencies administer the 
programs funded under a mix of state and federal provisions. 
147. Few areas of the law are as intertwined between state and federal provisions as 
welfare. 
148. See Porten Sullivan Corp. v. State, 318 Md. 387, 399-401, 568 A.2d 1111, 1116-
17 (1990). 
149. See MCEA, 346 Md. at 12-20, 694 A.2d at 942-46. 
150. The one-subject rule is not the once killed/always dead rule. 
151. See MD. CONST. art. III, § 29 (1981). 
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one to choke when the claim of incongruity is made. 152 
3. Porten Sullivan Mter MCEA 
MCEA recognized Porten Sullivan as definitive precedent for 
interpreting the one-subject rule,153 but only after emphasizing that 
the court has afforded the legislature significant leeway.154 While 
construing one-subject rule challenges,155 and even minimizing the 
number of occasions when the court has used the single-subject 
prong to strike down legislation,156 the MCEA court seemed to go 
off on a tangent rather than embrace the Porten Sullivan interpreta-
152. See MCEA, 346 Md. at 17 n.5, 694 A.2d at 945 n.5 (explaining that the court's 
role was to determine whether the legislature's act of joining two subjects was 
reasonable) . 
153. The court noted its recent exploration of "the history and purpose of the sin-
gle subject requirement" in Porten Sullivan and Prince Georgians, and quoted 
from Porten Sullivan to summarize "the objective of the clause as 'prevent[ing] 
the combination in one act of several and distinct incongruous subjects.' .. Id. 
at 12-13, 694 A.2d at 942-43 (quoting Porten Sullivan Corp. v. State, 318 Md. 
387,402,568 A.2d 1111, 1118 (1990». 
154. See id. at 13, 694 A.2d at 943. 
155. See id. at 12-14, 694 A.2d at 942-43. 
156. See id. at 14 n.3, 694 A.2d at 943 n.3. The MCEA court asserted that Curtis v. 
Mactier, 115 Md. 386, 80 A. 1066 (1911), was a descriptive-title prong case 
rather than a case that applied the entire one-subject rule. See MCEA, 346 Md. 
at 14 n.3, 694 A.2d at 943 n.3. Judge Pearce's opinion in Curtis does not sup-
port such a crimped construction because he wrote: 
The Act under consideration manifestly undertakes to legislate 
upon two wholly distinct subjects, under a title by which only one of 
those subjects is described. Even if the title had fully indicated both 
of the matters proposed to be covered by the Act, the situation 
would not have been improved, because this would nevertheless have 
been in obvious violation of section 29 of Article 3 of the State Con-
stitution which provides that 'every law enacted by the General As-
sembly shall embrace but one subject, and that shall be described by 
its title.' This. constitutional provision has been frequently construed, 
and there can be no difficulty in its application to the statute here 
involved. The purpose of the requirement we have quoted from the 
Constitution has been repeatedly defined. It is intended to accom-
plish two objects: 'The first is to prevent the combination in one Act 
of several distinct and incongruous subjects; and the second is that 
the Legislature and the people of the State may be fairly advised of 
the real nature of pending legislation.' 
Id. at 394, 80 A. at 1069 (citing County Comm'n. v. School Comm'rs Worcester 
County, 113 Md. 305,77 A. 605 (1910); Nutwell v. Anne Arundel County, 110 
Md. 667, 73 A. 710 (1909); Kafka v. Wilkinson, 99 Md. 238, 57 A. 617 (1904); 
State v. Norris, 70 Md. 91, 16 A. 445 (1889». 
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tive approach. 157 
Initially, the MCEA court seemed to have embraced the Parten 
Sullivan approach. 15S However, the MCEA court chose to travel a 
new path with regard to the scope of legislation involved, even 
though the Porten Sullivan court, in the portion approvingly 
adopted in MCEA, had stated: 
[N]otions of connection and interdependence may vary 
with the scope of the legislation involved. That is, a mea-
sure that begins life as a comprehensive one, and then has 
additional details inserted may survive a [one-subject rule] 
attack more readily than an originally narrow bill which be-
comes a very broad one. It is of some significance that the 
legislation involved in cases like Clinton, Panitz, Newrath, and 
Meekins was comprehensive at its outset; it was not vastly ex-
panded by incongruous amendments. 159 
Rather than considering how the vehicle l60 began its legislative life, 
however, the MCEA court wrote: 
Connection and interdependence can be on either a hori-
zontal or vertical plane. Two matters can be regarded as a 
single subject, for purposes of [the one-subject rule], either 
because of a direct connection between them, horizontally, 
or because they each have a direct connection to a broader 
common subject to which the Act relates. 161 
Although there was no clear conclusion as to which plane connected 
the matters in House Bill 1177, the court did find true interdepen-
dence between effective child support enforcement and welfare 
reform. 162 
157. See MCEA, 346 Md. at 15-16, 694 A.2d at 944. 
158. See id. at 14, 694 A.2d at 943. Indeed, the MCEA court announced: 
As we pointed out in Parten Sullivan, proper application of the "sin-
gle subject" clause requires consideration of how closely connected 
and interdependent the several matters contained within an Act may 
be, and "notions of connection and interdependence may vary with 
the scope of the legislation involved." 
Id. (citing Parten Sullivan, 318 Md. at 407, 568 A.2d at 1120). 
159. Parten Sullivan, 318 Md. at 407, 568 A.2d at ll20. 
160. The legislative "vehicle" is the main bill onto which the adornment is placed. 
See MCEA, 346 Md. at 15-16, 694 A.2d at 944. 
161. Id. 
1162. See id. at 20-21, 694 A.2d at 946. 
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Mter MCEA, Porten Sullivan remains vital. MCEA clearly recog-
nized and approved the courts' holdings in Porten Sullivan and 
Prince Georgians. 163 A bill with limited purposes could not, consistent 
with the one-subject rule, carry the weight of an unrelated mea-
sure. l64 Nevertheless, the MCEA court spoke of having either a 
"common umbrella" or a "common denominator,"165 terminology 
that was absent from the first two decisions in the trilogy.166 Neither 
these phrases nor reference to "horizontal or vertical" interconnec-
tion are as clear or apt as the Porten Sullivan admonition to deter-
mine whether the vehicle adorned started as a comprehensive or 
narrow bill. 167 
The measurably different emphasis placed on the nature of the 
original bill used in Porten Sullivan may be more than an academic 
distinction. It could be the basis for a different result in a given 
case. The following Part of this Article illustrates the potential im-
pact of MCEA by analyzing a recently enacted statute. The statute 
analyzed is House Bill 1394, which the Maryland General Assembly 
enacted in 1996. 168 While this statute has never faced a one-subject 
rule challenge in the courts, it will serve as a basis to illustrate the 
potential impact of the MCEA court's holding. 
III. AN ILLUSTRATIVE ANALYSIS OF HOUSE BILL 1394 (1996) 
In 1996, House Bill 1394 was introduced by the Washington 
County House Delegation as an act "concerning Washington County 
- Hotel Tax - Civil War Tourism [f] or the purpose of altering the 
rate of the hotel tax imposed in Washington County."169 The sub-
stance of the introduced bill merely increased the rate of the Wash-
ington County hotel tax from 3% to 3.5% for fiscal year 1997, and 
provided that the additional revenues should be used to promote 
Civil War tourism in the Washington County area. 170 The bill un ani-
163. See id. at 15, 694 A.2d at 943-44. 
164. See id. at 15, 694 A.2d at 944 ("Parten Sullivan and Prince Georgians illustrate the 
kind of circumstances in which the 'single subject' requirement is, in fact, 
violated."). 
165. Id. 
166. See supra notes 58-103 and accompanying text. 
167. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
168. See 1996 Md. Laws ch. 665. 
169. 2 JOURNAL OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF MARYLAND, at 1032 
(1996). 
170. See Floor Repart of the House Ways and Means Committee found in the bill file on 
H.B. 1394, found in the Department of Legislative Reference Library, 90 State 
Circle, Annapolis. 
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mously passed in the House on March 22, 1996.171 
The Senate transmogrified 172 the bill. The title was revised to 
state that the amended bill was an act concerning "Local Subdivi-
sions-Revenues." The amended bill went beyond the version passed 
in the House by "authorizing Baltimore City to use certain highway 
user revenues ... [and permitting the use] 'by certain local subdivi-
sions' " of certain revenues to promote tourism. 173 The text of the 
amended bill allowed Baltimore City to use highway user revenues 
for fiscal year 1997 to finance the costs of convention center mar-
keting and debt service. 174 In addition, the amended bill altered the 
City Charter's general powers so that the city could impose a hotel 
and room tax of up to 7.5% for fiscal year 1997.175 
The Senate version of House Bill 1394 passed the Senate,176 and 
the House concurred (95-33) in the Senate version. 177 The result 
was that a bill relating solely to supporting Civil War Tourism in 
Washington County transmogrified into a bill to do that and 
more-fund convention center marketing and debt service. l78 
Under the proscription in Porten Sullivan,179 this enactment would 
171. See 2 JOURNAL OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOUSE at 1855. 
172. Cf Porten Sullivan Corp. v. State, 318 Md. 387, 395,568 A.2d 1111, 1114 
(1990). 
173. 3 JOURNAL OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE OF MARYLAND, at 2930 (1996). 
174. See id. at 2931. 
175. See id. at 2931-32. 
176. See id. at 2932. 
177. See 4 JOURNAL OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF MARYLAND, at 
3056 (1996). 
178. The bill as amended and enacted is found at 1996 Md. Laws ch. 665. On its 
face, the numerous amendments are obvious. The legislative file in the De-
partment of Legislative Reference Library contains both the "Floor Report" by 
the House Ways and Means Committee and the "Concurrence Report" after 
the Senate action. Read together, the transformation is apparent. The Floor 
Report to the unadorned bill characterized it as a local Washington County 
bill which increased the Washington County Hotel Tax and required expendi-
tures for the promotion of Civil War Tourism in Washington County. See 2 
JOURNAL OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF MARYLAND, at 1032 
(1996). On the other hand, the Concurrence Report refers to the previously 
stated purpose and describes the Senate amendments as, permitting Baltimore 
City to use up to $5 million of its Highway User Revenues in FY 97 for Con-
vention Center Marketing and prohibiting the City from increasing its hotel 
tax rate above 7.5%. See 4 JOURNAL OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE OF MARy-
LAND, at 3056 (1996). 
179. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
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appear void as far as the adornments for Baltimore City were 
concerned. 
House Bill 1394 did not begin life as a comprehensive bill. It had 
a distinct, limited purpose-the promotion of Civil War tourism in 
Washington County.180 As amended, it appears painfully similar to 
the statutory provision voided in Prince Georgians. 181 How congruous 
or germane is support for Civil War tourism in Washington County 
with debt service and marketing for a Convention Center in Balti-
more City? Thus, applying Porten Sullivan and Prince Georgians, one 
would conclude that the relationship is too attenuated. 
On the other hand, the later decided MCEA, with its distinction 
between horizontal and vertical interconnection,182 and with the 
statute's amended title rubric of tourism, might offer a rationale for 
approval. I83 However, MCEA dealt with a vehicle that started its leg-
islative life as a comprehensive measure, not as an originally narrow 
bill. 184 Notably, the Porten Sullivan discussion that was avoided in 
MCEA, seems vitally important, particularly to those watching the 
legislative session. A legislator, a lobbyist, or citizens in favor of or 
against aid to the Baltimore City Convention Center would have 
had no realistic need to be concerned about a Washington County 
local bill aimed at Civil War Tourism. The joinder of these two sub-
jects, aid to the Convention Center with a Western Maryland local 
bill,185 was joinder of the non-germane. Regardless, Chapter 665 of 
the 1996 Laws of Maryland has never been challenged in the 
courts. 186 
This example illustrates that Maryland legislators will continue 
to find vehicles to attach unrelated adornments. These amalgams 
will be the exception, rather than the regular mode of legislating in 
180. See supra notes 169-70 and accompanying text. 
181. See generally State v. Prince Georgians for Glendening, 329 Md. 68, 71, 617 
A.2d 586, 587 (1993). 
182. See Maryland Classified Employees Ass'n v. State, 346 Md. 1, 15-16, 694 A.2d 
937,944 (1997). 
183. Can a Washington County hotel tax for use for Civil War Tourism be vertically 
connected through tourism to Baltimore City's use of its highway revenues 
and its hotel tax for marketing of, and debt service on, the Convention 
Center located in Baltimore? 
184. Compare Porten Sullivan Corp. v. State, 318 Md. 387, 407, 568 A.2d 1111, 1120 
(1990), with supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text. 
185. See supra notes 169-78 and accompanying text. 
186. When no attack is mounted, the one-subject rule does not become a dead let-
ter; rather, it seems to become an unused letter. See generally Parten Sullivan, 
318 Md. 387, 568 A.2d 1111. 
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Maryland because the one-subject rule chastens and circumscribes 
the vast bulk of state enactments. 187 Nonetheless, it is relevant to 
question how freely these exceptions will persist if constitutional 
challenges are mounted in the courts. 
While MCEA recognized Porten Sullivan as the interpretative 
precedent,188 MCEA is surely a step, perhaps a leap, away from the 
vitality infused in the one-subject rule by Porten Sullivan. MCEA 
clearly applies a liberal interpretive approach, giving deference to 
legislative action. 189 The MCEA court announced: 
That liberal approach is intended to accommodate a signifi-
cant range and degree of political compromise that necessa-
rily attends the legislative process in a healthy, robust de-
mocracy. It has sufficient fluidity to accommodate, as well, 
the fact that many of the issues facing the General Assembly 
today are far more complex than those coming before it in 
earlier times and that the legislation needed to address the 
problems underlying those issues often must be 
multifaceted. 190 
The need for multifaceted legislation has been the excuse for 
congressional enactments that join apparently disparate subjects. 191 
Thus, the language employed by the MCEA court raises the ques-
tion: Will MCEA lead Maryland's legislature to embrace the pattern 
of lawmaking that has become prevalent in Congress? 
187. The one-subject rule surely is known to staff. See supra note 51. 
188. See supra note 153 and accompanying text. 
189. See Maryland Classified Employees Ass'n v. State, 346 Md. 1, 13-14, 694 A.2d 
937,943 (1997). 
190. [d. The court's footnote to this passage illuminated the point further: 
[d. 
The marked growth in the size, scope, and complexity of State gov-
ernment itself, along with the new areas over which it has asserted 
regulatory jurisdiction, are matters of common knowledge subject to 
judicial notice. Simplistic and single-focused approaches are not al-
ways possible, and indeed may well be wholly inappropriate, when 
dealing with some of the health, environmental, economic, and so-
cial problems facing modem society. 
191. A clear recent joinder of disparate subjects occurred when Congress passed, 
in 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, which joined immigration reform enactments 
and other non-spending substantive matters with an appropriations bill. See 
Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 
Stat. 3009 (1996). 
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IV. AN UNBRIDLED CONGRESS 
Congress has no constitutionally imposed one-subject con-
straint. Consequently, federal enactments can include disparate sub-
jects in one legislative vehicle, as recently evidenced by the passage 
of an omnibus appropriations bill that included a provision on im-
migration reform. 192 Christmas Tree bills-uncontroversial or essential 
measures on which "ornaments" consisting of a host of unrelated, 
disparate items-are a frequent congressional method of 
legislating. 193 
192. In 1997, the Congress passed 110 Stat. 3009 (1997), described as "An Act mak-
ing omnibus consolidated appropriations for the fiscal year ending September 
30, 1997, and for other purposes." [d. The other purposes included the follow-
ing: (1) a 178 page adornment "Division C-Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996," 110 Stat. 3009-546 to 3009-724; (2) the 
"Small Business Programs Improvement Act," 110 Stat. 3009-724; (3) a "Gun 
Ban for Individuals Convicted of a Misdemeanor Crime of Domestic Vio-
lence," 110 stat. 3009-371; and (4) a declaration of legislative policy regarding 
18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1996), 110 Stat. 3009-369 to 3009-371 (1996), an apparent 
attempt to affect United States v. Lopez., 514 U.S. 549, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995), 
which had declared that § 922 (a) exceeded Congress's commerce clause au-
thority. [d. The President's Signing Statement for Pub. L. No. 104-208 recog-
nized the adorned scope of the appropriations act: 
This, bill, however, does more than fund major portions of the Gov-
ernment for the next fiscal year. It also includes landmark immigra-
tion reform legislation that builds on our progress of the last 3 years. 
It strengthens the rule of law by cracking down on illegal immigra-
tion at the border, in the workplace, and in the criminal justice sys-
tem- without punishing those living in the United States legally. 
Omnibus Consolidation Appropriations Act, Statement by President of U.S., 
Pub. L. No. 104-208, 1996 U.S.C.CAN. (110 Stat. 3009) 3388, 3391. The sign-
ing statement even recognized the Congressional methods of adorning legisla-
tion when the President complained that an adornment he sought had not 
been added: 
I am disappointed that one of my priorities- a ban on physician 
"gag rules"- was not included. Several States have passed similar leg-
islation to ensure that doctors have the freedom to inform their pa-
tients of the full range of medical treatment options, and I am disap-
pointed that the Congress was not able to reach agreement on this 
measure. 
[d. at 3392. 
193. The Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, was described by the 
President in his Signing Statement as "a balanced package of spending provi-
sions that includes targeted program cuts while it invests in America's future." 
President's Statement on Signing the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, 33 WKLY. 
COMPo PRES. Doc. 1190 (Aug. 11, 1997). The Act, however, contained numer-
ous non-spending adornments: (1) "a sentencing commission ... charged 
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A particularly expansive example occurred with the enactment 
of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988.194 The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 
1988 was a drug fighting bill, impervious to challenge. The act was 
altered to include such incongruous measures as follows: child por-
nography and obscenity legislation,195 reform of the U.S. Marshals 
service,196 truck and bus safety regulatory reform,197 and putative re-
peal of McNally v. United States,198 which had circumscribed mail 
fraud prosecutions. 199 
with developing a Truth-in-Sentencing system"; (2) a Department of Justice in-
itiative to deal with "a number of Establishment Clause constitutional con-
cerns with respect to" health care services under Medicare and Medicaid; (3) 
an authorization to the Department "of Health and Human Services to de-
velop a legislative proposal for establishing a case-mix adjusted prospective 
payment system for payment of long-term care hospitals under the Medicare 
program"; and (4) broaden authorization to the Federal Communications 
Commission "to auction the right to use the radio and television spectrum." 
Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, 101 Stat. 251, 671-71, 677-72 
(1997). 
194. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988). The 
Act contained 364 pages but its legislative history had neither a Senate nor 
House Report. See id. at 5937. It had ten titles, some of which were unrelated 
to drug enforcement. 
195. This statute, 102 Stat. 4485 (1988), was enacted as part of the Anti-Drug Abuse 
Act as the "subtitle [to] be cited as the 'Child Protection and Obscenity En-
forcement Act of 1988.' " Id. 
196. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 3 U.S.C.C.A.N. (102 Stat. 
4512-17). 
197. Id. at 4527-35 (1988). This section was enacted as part of the Anti-Drug Abuse 
Act as the "subtitle" to be "cited as the 'Truck and Bus Safety and Regulatory 
Reform Act of 1988.' " Id. 
198. 483 U.S. 350 (1987). 
199. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181, 4508 
(1988). The background for this amendment and a critique of the congres-
sional process is found in Geraldine Szott Moohr, The Federal Interest in Crimi-
nal Law, 47 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1127 (1997). There, the author writes: 
In 1987, the Supreme Court brought intangible rights prosecutions 
to an unexpected halt by deciding, in McNally v. United States, that 
the mail fraud statute was limited to the protection of property rights 
and did not protect intangible rights such as honest services .... 
[T]he Court invited Congress to "speak more clearly than it has" if it 
intended the statute to reach intangible rights. 
Congress promptly responded to the Court's challenge to "speak 
more clearly" and reinstated the intangible rights doctrine by amend-
ing the mail fraud statute. 
Id. at 1166-67. Although the author noted the prompt legislative response, she 
documented the limited legislative history, the adornment on an election year 
Christmas Tree Bill, and the judicial recognition of the inadequacy of the 
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Another typical example of a Christmas Tree bill is the Violent 
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994.200 This act was a 
355 page statute that contained a host of miscellaneous adornments 
far removed from violent crime, and included as follows: (1) a clari-
fying amendment regarding the scope of prohibition against gam-
bling on ships in international waters;201 (2) enactment of the "Rec-
reational Hunting Safety Act" with provisions barring "obstruction 
of a lawful hunt" and providing civil penalties therefor;202 and (3) 
"Other Provisions"203 dealing with, inter alia, "labels on products,"204 
"non-dischargeability of payment of restitution order[s],"205 new 
Federal Rules of Evidence making "evidence of similar crimes [ad-
missible] in sex offense cases,"206 the "definition of livestock,"207 and 
disclosure of wiretap information to impede a criminal 
investigation.208 
In the absence of anyone-subject constraint, Congress engaged 
in one of its spectacles of joinder of the incongruous in temporal 
juxtaposition to MCEA-they happened at the same time. The con-
gressional spectacle involved the Disaster Relief Act of 1997, a bill 
needed to authorize federal funds to help the flood ravaged upper 
Mid-west, as well as other areas devastated by tornadoes and other 
natural calamities.209 When presented for final congressional ap-
Congressional process, writing: 
The legislative history of the amendment is limited to a single pre-
passage statement by Representative Conyers indicating that the pro-
vision was intended to restore the intangible rights doctrine. See 134 
CONGo REc. Hll108-01 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988) (explaining that 
amendment "restores the mail fraud provision to where [it] was 
before the McNally decision" so that, if passed, "it is no longer neces-
sary to determine whether or not the scheme ... involved money or 
property"); see also United States V. Brumley, 79 F.3d 1430, 143640 (5th 
Cir.) (characterizing legislative history of amendment as inadequate), 
reh'g en banc granted, 91 F.3d 676 (5th Cir. 1996). 
Id. at 1167-68 n.196. 
200. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994). 
20l. See id. at 2114. 
202. Id. at 2121-23. 
203. Id. at 1806, 2123. 
204. Id. at 2135. 
205. Id. 
206. Id. at 2135-37. 
207. Id. at 2128. 
208. See id. at 2123. 
209. See Veto of H.R. 1469-1997 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for 
Recovery from Natural Disasters, and for Overseas Peacekeeping Efforts In-
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proval, emergency appropriations for "recovery from natural disas-
ters" and "overseas peacekeeping efforts" were tied to the establish-
ment of a "National Commission on the Cost of Higher 
Education"210 and a "State option to issue food stamps to legal im-
migrants."211 More notable, however, were the engraftments dealing 
with controversial subjects, such as a ban on sampling during the 
year 2000 decennial census,212 and preventing government shut-
downs upon failure to enact funding for the upcoming fiscal year. 213 
These controversial adornments were the major reason given for a 
presidential veto on June 9, 1997.214 Coincidentally, this was the day 
MCEA was decided.215 A few days after the veto, Congress passed a 
disaster relief bill with fewer adornments. This congressional legisla-
tive process demonstrates all too well the melange that can arise 
when legislation is unconstrained by the one-subject rule. 
The absence of anything akin to the one-subject rule allows 
Congress to join incongruous items together at the convenience of 
legislators with clout. Late in the 1997 Session of Congress, a partic-
ularly defining example of congressional maneuvering became pub-
lic. A plan to reimburse persons acquitted of federal crimes was 
"slipped into a $31 billion spending bill that cover[ed] the Justice 
Department"216 by "a one paragraph amendment [that was] 'quietly' 
put on the appropriations bill. "217 The amendment generated a 
fierce media debate about the effect of the novel proposal.218 At 
least one representative, a former law professor, said, "I take a very 
dim view of the way this was handled. . . . We shouldn't just ram 
something like this through without all of the aspects and nu-
ances. "219 This comment reflects existing attitudes that demonstrate 
why the one-subject rule is clearly justified. 
eluding Those in Bosnia, 6 V.S.C.C.C.A. D22. 
210. H.R CONF. REp. No. lO5-19, at 123 (1997). 
211. [d. at 124. 
212. See id. 
213. See HR CONF. REp. No. 105-19, at 123 (1997). 
214. See id. 
215. See Maryland Classified Employees Ass'n v. State, 346 Md. 1, 1, 694 A.2d 937, 
937 (1997). 
216. Angie Cannon & David Hess, With Plan to Reimburse Federal Acquittals, Who 
Would Pay the Real Price?, WASH. POST, October 19, 1997, at AlO. 
217. [d. 
218. See, e.g., id.; Angie Cannon & David Hess, A Bid to Make U.S. Pay if Prosecutors 
Lose, PHlLA. INQUIRER, October 13, 1997, at AI. 
219. Cannon & Hess, supra note 216, at AlO (quoting David E. Skaggs, a Represen-
tative from Colorado and former law professor). 
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Finding congruity among the disparate items embodied in 
these illustrative congressional packages is inconceivable. No such 
mixture would be conceptually acceptable under the one-subject 
rule. The only connection among these items is their location in a 
bill that was sure to pass. They have virtually no interdependent 
purpose except for the need of a vehicle to become law. They have 
no common denominator. They are surely not horizontally con-
nected, and vertical connection occurs, if at all, only because the 
bill might be termed an omnibus vehicle designed to clean out the 
legislative stables. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The congressional process is no model for Maryland. The con-
gressional process discounts due consideration for separate subjects, 
fomenting packages that hide, rather than illume matters. It may be 
fervently hoped that the spectacle of the ongoing Congressional pro-
cess sobers those who would embellish MCEA. The congruous stan-
dard ought not become a homogenous standard that ignores Porten 
Sullivan and Prince Georgians. The one-subject rule should continue 
to be an impediment to legislative excess in Maryland. 
